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Abstract
Participating life insurance contracts and pension plans often include a return guarantee
and participation in the surplus of the institution’s result. The final account value in such
contracts depends on the investment policy driven by solvency requirements, as well as on
the level of market returns, the guarantee and the participation rates. Using a contingent
claim model for such contracts, we assume a competitive market with minimum solvency
requirements similar to Solvency II. We consider solvency requirements on maturity and
one-year time horizons, as well as contracts with single and periodic premium payments.
Through numerical analyses, we link the expected returns for equity holders and policy-
holders in various situations. Using the return on equity and policyholder internal rate of
return along with utility measures, we assess which contract settings optimize the return
compromise for both stakeholders in a low-interest-rate environment. Our results extend
the academic literature by building on the work by Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) and are
relevant for practitioners, given the current financial market environment and difficulties in
insurance-linked savings plans with guarantees.
Key words life insurance products · interest rate guarantee · policyholder participation ·
return on investment
1 Introduction
Defined-contributions-funded pension plans in many old-age provision systems, as well as the
traditional with-profits endowment insurance policies sold in German-speaking countries include
interest rate guarantees and profit participation for the insureds. The guaranteed interest is
based on the value of the savings and credited on a yearly basis to the policyholders’ accounts.
In life insurance policies, the interest rate for this “cliquet-style” guarantee is typically set for
the whole contract duration at inception; in pension plans, this rate is adapted periodically
and called “technical interest”. The profit participation is calculated as a share of the pension
scheme or insurance company surplus. Technical rates for reserving and profit participation are
regulated by supervisory authorities and/or the government. For example, authorities typically
set a maximum value for the technical interest rate to limit the solvency hazards for providers.
∗This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in European Actuarial Journal. The
final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13385-018-0179-1.
†Charbel Mirza (charbel.mirza@unil.ch) and Joe¨l Wagner (joel.wagner@unil.ch) are with the Department
of Actuarial Science, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne. The second author is also with
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Furthermore, there is often a minimum value for profit participation to grant the insureds ade-
quate participation in their provider’s excess return.1 These traditional life insurance products
are very popular among customers; products with guarantees account for approximately 75
percent of the market in Germany (International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2016,
Table 1).
Participating life insurance contracts and funded pension plans feature a combination of
the following components: yearly interest credited to the savings account, participation in the
insurer’s profit, and a high level of safety through imposed solvency requirements. To limit
the risk exposure for companies offering interest rate guarantees, the technical interest rate is
limited (see Grosen and Jorgensen, 2002, and Eling and Holder, 2013a, for an overview).2 In fact,
given that the rates applied mostly do not need approval by the financial market authorities,
the latter prescribe certain special requirements, including those for technical interest rates
and surrender values. In the European Union (E.U.) and Switzerland, technical interest rates
are limited to the 60 percent 10-year rolling average return of local government bonds (see
European Union, 1992, Art. 18, European Union, 2002, Art. 20, and Swiss Federal Council,
2005, Art. 121). We illustrate the evolution of the situation in Switzerland in Figure 1. The
return of 10-year Swiss government bonds decreased from approximately 6% in the early 1990s
to negative yields in 2015. We observe that the adaptation of the maximum technical interest
has been relatively slow. In January 2016, the rate was set to 0.75 percent in Switzerland; in
2015 it was 1.25 percent in Germany (German Federal Ministry of Justice, 2014b). In the past,
given intuitive sales arguments and naive contract valuation (i.e., that “contracts with higher
guarantees are better”), most market players offered the maximum allowed technical rate as
guarantee to their individual customers. This led Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) to investigate
raising the optimal level for the upper boundary rate set by the regulator (also see below). The
current development in the financial markets with lower interest rates accompanied by relatively
higher return volatility makes guarantees more difficult for insurers to manage. Currently, most
companies have stopped offering the maximum allowed, and they often offer guarantees below
the nominal value of the customer savings premiums. Some firms have even stopped offering
products with guarantees or have sold their traditional business to investors (see, e.g., Baloise
Group, 2015, in Germany).
The holders of traditional life insurance policies participate in the insurer’s surplus, an
important component of the final payoff to policyholders. The minimum surplus participation
rate in German life insurance contracts is defined at 90% (German Federal Ministry of Justice,
2014a). This also holds for Swiss collective life insurance (see Federal Assembly of the Swiss
Confederation, 2004, Art. 37, and Swiss Federal Council, 2005, Art. 147). This rate, the so-
called “legal quote,” has been a subject of discussion in recent years (Killer, 2015). Furthermore,
to ensure an adequate safety level for insurance companies, regulatory authorities require a
certain equity level for firms to operate. Their solvency level is monitored on a yearly basis.
The Swiss Solvency Test (SST), which has been in force since 2011 (see Swiss Financial Market
1In this paper, we focus on the products offered in Switzerland and Germany, where participating life insurance
with guarantees is very popular. In Swiss collective life insurance contracts, the interest rate defined by the
authorities is to be followed exactly. The lower bound for policyholders’ profit participation holds in German
participating life insurance contracts and in Swiss collective life insurance.
2A short review of insurer defaults linked to interest rate guarantees is provided, for example, in the Intro-
duction in Schmeiser and Wagner (2015). The references cited therein (see their Footnote 2) give more detailed
information. Following the introduction of the Solvency II regulation in the European Union, some of the condi-
tions, in particular those linked to the asset allocation have been relaxed and replaced by a more comprehensive
risk assessment, see, e.g., Braun et al. (2018).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the historical 10-year Swiss Government Bond yields (in %) from 1988
to 2017 and the maximum technical interest rate defined by the 60% of the 10-year rolling
average on the bond’s return.
Note: Data from FINMA (see www.finma.ch/en/supervision/insurers/sector-specific-tools/individual-
life-insurance) and Swiss National Bank (see data.snb.ch/en).
Supervisory Authority, FINMA, and, e.g., Eling et al., 2008, for a discussion), is considered
equivalent (European Commission, 2015) to the Solvency II framework of the E.U. enforced
since January 2016. Through its value-at-risk approach, the latter explicitly requires that risk
capital maintain the annual probability of ruin lower than 0.5 percent (see, European Union,
2009, Art. 64, European Union, 2014).
Our research focus is as follows. Building on Schmeiser and Wagner (2015), we aim to
analyze the link between the main insurance contract features – the levels of interest rate
guarantee and policyholder participation – and equity holder and policyholder returns. In
fact, under a competitive market assumption and solvency requirements, both contract features
entail a unique optimal solution for the required initial equity and asset allocation strategy. We
compare the results obtained in the earlier paper, assuming upfront premiums and default at
maturity to situations with periodic monitoring. The model framework that we use is similar
to the one introduced by Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) and a recent working paper by Braun
et al. (2015). Unlike the first study, which focuses on the maximum technical interest rate fixed
by the regulator, we consider both contract parameters and guarantee and participation rates
and analyze their interaction. We also introduce two different cases, allowing us to compare
contracts with single upfront premiums, with default at maturity, with overall ruin probability,
and with a single investment decision on one hand and with periodic premiums, with yearly
control of defaults, with annual safety level monitoring and annual adaptation of asset allocation
on the other. Braun et al. (2015) also build on the model framework introduced by Schmeiser
and Wagner (2015). They extend the earlier analysis by including regular premiums, death and
surrender payouts, stochastic interest rates and early defaults. In contrast to the two above
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studies, we consider the effective rate of return on the policyholders’ savings premiums beyond
the utility assessment, focus on the participation rates offered to clients and consider the equity
holder’s position not only by requiring fairly valued contracts but also by analyzing the expected
return on the invested equity.
Our study, as well as the two works cited above, are part of the literature on participating life
insurance contracts. Given the model framework used in the analyses, the stream of literature
includes works focusing on the fair valuation of insurance liabilities (e.g., Grosen and Jorgensen,
2000, Gatzert and Kling, 2007), on the contingent claim approach (e.g., Briys and de Varenne,
1997, Grosen and Jorgensen, 2002), and on the value creation for customers (e.g., Gatzert
et al., 2012). A numerical analysis of the interaction of guarantees, surplus distribution and
asset allocation can be found in Kling et al. (2007a) and Kling et al. (2007b). The recent work
by Eling and Holder (2013b) analyzes alternative guarantee designs. We refer the reader to the
references contained in the above papers for a larger overview.
Our three main results are as follows: (1) we confirm the study by Schmeiser and Wagner
(2015) concluding that lower guarantees can lead to higher values for customers and extend
their model including periodic premiums, yearly solvency restrictions and asset allocation; (2)
we observe that, in the set of fairly priced contracts, the interaction of guarantees, participation,
solvency considerations and asset allocation must be carefully analyzed and handled in the
development of new product offerings; (3) we conclude that contract parameterizations that
offer constant returns on equity to equity holders while preserving (or even increasing) average
return rates for policyholders are available. More specifically, we find that lower policy interest
rate guarantees and lower participation rates offered to customers lead, on average, to higher
customer returns and to higher return on equity (see also the conclusion detailed in Section 5).
Our results can be applied to individual life, collective life and pension insurance featuring
guarantees and participation components.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model
framework. We introduce the insurer investment and policyholder accounts and the payoffs
under default risk, and we describe the market constraints and regulatory requirements con-
sidered. We also define how we measure the returns and the utility for both equity holders
and policyholders. In Section 3, we describe the model parameterization. Section 4 reports the
results obtained in our models and provides detailed sensitivity analyses. We conclude in Sec-
tion 5. The Appendix gives detailed notes on the model implementation and provides further
results.
2 Model Framework
The guaranteed interest, the underlying investment and policyholder participation in the surplus
are closely linked to the savings component of life insurance policies. Thus, we follow the
exposition of Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) and consider a basic life insurance model, putting
our focus on policyholders’ savings accounts. We focus on the savings premium, that is, the
premium amount available for investment after deducting transaction costs and the term life
premium (we suppose that mortality risk is diversified).
Because we want to consider default risk explicitly in our model, we use the contingent claim
model framework first introduced by Doherty and Garven (1986) and Briys and de Varenne
(1997). In their setup, insolvency risk is considered at the end of the contract (see our model A).
This model is justifiable as long as payouts occur only at the maturity of the contract. In the
second model, we introduce (see model B) solvency testing and shortfalls on a yearly basis, as
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it is done in current solvency frameworks (see also Grosen and Jorgensen, 2002, Bernard et al.,
2005, and, more recently, Braun et al., 2015). This model setup will allow us to monitor solvency
levels on a yearly basis (and allow for defaults, i.e., no negative equity capital allowed) and to
adapt asset allocation. Following the previous models, we consider complete and arbitrage-free
capital markets. Finally, we require risk-adequate positions for equity holders and policyholders
and assume solvency regulation, defining an upper bound for the ruin probability (at maturity
in model A and on a yearly basis in model B).
2.1 Insurer’s Investment and Policyholders’ Accounts
In both models, we consider that the policyholder pays a stream of previously known savings
premiums Πt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, at the beginning of each year during the whole contract dura-
tion T . In model (A), we assume a single upfront premium can be deduced by setting Πt = 0
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1. At contract inception in t = 0, the insurance company investors provide
an amount of equity capital that we denote with E0. The initial insurer’s assets A0 correspond
to the equity capital E0. At the beginning of every period, the savings premium Πt is added to
company assets, and the whole amount is invested in the capital market, leading to a stochastic
value of assets At for t = 1, . . . T .
We follow the two-asset model introduced in Merton (1969) and assume that the assets At
at times t = 0, . . . , T − 1, are invested in two asset classes. For the first class (I), we consider
a risk-free asset with returns r
(I)
t in the periods t = 1, . . . , T . For the second class (II), we
consider a risky asset with returns r
(II)
t , t = 1, . . . , T . The portfolio return is given by a mix of
two asset returns as follows: in each period t = 1, . . . , T , we assume that a share γt of the assets
At−1 available at the beginning of the periods is invested in class (I) and that the remaining
part (1 − γt) is invested in class (II). Because we do not consider interim assessments in the
model (A), we have γt = γ, where γ is fixed at the beginning of the contract and for the whole
duration. In model (B), γt will be reviewed yearly on the basis of previous asset performance,
the accruing asset value from additional premium payments and with respect to the limit on the
probability of ruin. We show how to calculate γt for model (B) in Section 3. In both cases (A)
and (B), the periodic portfolio return in periods t = 1, . . . , T can be written as
Rt = γt e
r
(I)
t + (1− γt) e
r
(II)
t − 1, (1)
and, combining the asset returns and the premium payments, the value of the portfolio assets
in times t = 1, . . . , T is given by
At = (At−1 + Πt−1) · (1 +Rt). (2)
Following Schmeiser and Wagner (2015), we suppose that the risk-free asset has a constant
return rf over the whole period, i.e., r
(I)
t = rf . We consider the returns from the risky asset (II)
to be normally distributed. We set W Pt , t = 0, . . . , T a standard geometric Brownian motion
on a probability space (Ω,Φ,P) with Φt, t = 0, . . . , T the generated filtration of the Brownian
motion and P the real-world measure. The stochastic process is determined by a given drift µB
and volatility σB, which gives us the return r
(II)
t = µB−σ
2
B/2+σB
(
W Pt −W
P
t−1
)
, for t = 1, . . . , T .
This leads us to the recursive formula defining the evolution of the insurer’s asset portfolio at
times t = 1, . . . , T ,
At = (At−1 + Πt−1) ·
[
γt e
rf + (1− γt) e
µB−σ
2
B/2+σB(W
P
t −W
P
t−1)
]
(3)
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with initial condition A0 = E0 and given savings premiums Πt, t = 0, . . . , T −1. We call [1+R
P
t ]
the expression in brackets [·] in Equation (3), i.e.,
RPt = γt e
rf + (1− γt) e
µB−σ
2
B/2+σB(W
P
t −W
P
t−1) − 1. (4)
Thus, the actual asset value is calculated from the risk-free and risky investment returns, given
the portfolio asset allocation defined through γt.
The policyholder savings account value Pt, t = 0, . . . , T , i.e., the insurer’s liabilities, evolves
as follows. The premiums Πt are added to the savings account. The insurer yearly guarantees a
minimum interest rate of g on the account value over the whole contract duration. Furthermore,
the policyholder participates at a rate α in the insurer’s investment returns RPt .
3 At the end
of the period the savings account is credited with the greater rate between g and αRPt . Hence,
the evolution of the policyholder account Pt, t = 1, . . . , T is given by
Pt = (Pt−1 + Πt−1) ·
[
1 + max
(
g, αRPt
)]
, (5)
where P0 = 0. In the case where the company remains solvent during the whole contract
duration, the policyholder gets the payout PT .
2.2 Policyholder and Investor Payoffs under Default Risk
Model (A). In Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) and our model (A), the main concern is the
solvency at time t = T . In fact, we consider no payouts until T , and shortfall happens only at
maturity. The insurer is said to be solvent at time T if the value of the insurance assets AT
is higher than the value of the liabilities PT . The cost of the insolvency DT or the default put
option (cf. Doherty and Garven, 1986; Butsic, 1994) is the value of the deficit of the company
when bankruptcy occurs. We can write out
DT = (PT −AT )
+, (6)
where (·)+ stands for max(·; 0). DT = 0 when the assets AT exceed the liabilities PT . If the
assets are insufficient to cover the liabilities, DT yields the difference PT −AT > 0. By allowing
for defaults at contract maturity T , the final policyholder payoff LT is
LT = PT −DT = PT − (PT −AT )
+. (7)
The equity holder stake ET at time T is given by the remaining assets after the policyholder
has been paid out, i.e.,
ET = AT − LT = (AT − PT )
+. (8)
Model (B). In reality, solvency regulation requires insurance companies to control safety
levels on a yearly basis. Thus, monitoring possible defaults and considering the consequences
when business activity stops extends the model (A). If bankruptcy occurs at some time t∗ > 0,
we assume that the contract is stopped and the policyholder is paid out the available funds.
3In this simple setup, following Schmeiser and Wagner (2015), we directly link the investment return to the
return credited to the policyholder account. Since in practice smoothing mechanisms for the surplus distribution
are in place, our results overestimate the asset volatility. We show that our conceptual findings remain valid by
comparing our results with simulations using a much lower asset volatility (compare the results from Tables 4
and 5 in Section 4.1 with Tables 8 and 9 reported in the Appendix).
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Furthermore, we suppose that the payoff in t∗ is then invested at the risk-free rate rf until time
T .4 In analogy to the notations above, the cost of the insurer insolvency at time t∗ is defined
by D∗t ,
Dt∗ = Pt∗ −At∗ > 0. (9)
While taking into account the amount of losses when insolvency occurs at t∗, the amount due
to the policyholder LT at maturity T is given by
LT =
{
(Pt∗ −Dt∗) e
rf(T−t
∗) when default occurs at time t∗ > 0,
PT when no default occurs.
(10)
The equity holder stake ET at maturity T is given through the formula in Equation (8).
2.3 Market Constraints and Regulatory Requirements
In the following, we formally introduce our assumptions about the market and the regulatory
environment. The contracts offered have consequences for the insurer’s asset allocation. Atop
the risk-neutral valuation used for pricing purposes, we consider return and utility measures
used by the equity holders and policyholders to assess the contract.
Pricing in a Competitive Market
Under the assumption of an arbitrage-free capital market, we evaluate the equity holder and
policyholder claims under the Q-measure using the concept of risk-neutral valuation. Under
Q, the evolution of the insurer’s asset portfolio At, t = 1, . . . , T is given by (compare with
Equation (3)):
At = (At−1 + Πt−1) ·
[
γt e
rf + (1− γt) e
rf−σ
2
B/2+σB(W
Q
t −W
Q
t−1)
]
. (11)
Here, WQt is a Q-Brownian motion. Under the risk-neutral measure, the values of the poli-
cyholder and equity holder stakes at time t = 0 are given by EQ0 [LT ] = E
Q[e−rfT · LT ] and
EQ0 [ET ] = E
Q[e−rfT · ET ], respectively, where E[·] denotes the expected value and LT and ET
are defined through Equations (7) and (8) (in model A) and (10) and (8) (in model B).
The competitive market assumption implies risk-adequate or fair pricing. That is, at the
beginning of the contract and for the policyholder, the present value of the payoff equals the
present value of the premium payments. For the equity holder, risk-adequate returns on the
capital are generated and, thus, an appropriate return is ensured. Hence, the net present value
of the equity holder and policyholder payoff must equal zero, i.e., we have the equity holder
condition
EQ0 [ET ]− E0 = 0, (12)
and the policyholder condition
EQ0 [LT ]−
T−1∑
t=0
(
e−rft · Πt
)
= 0. (13)
Both conditions are equivalent because no arbitrage possibilities are assumed. In the case of a
4We do not consider that a guarantee fund will step in and ensure the interest g, see, e.g., Rymaszewski et al.
(2012); Schmeiser and Wagner (2013).
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single upfront premium (model A), Equation (13) reduces to EQ0 [LT ] − Π0 = 0 (cf. Schmeiser
and Wagner, 2015).
Solvency Requirement
Solvency regulation in Europe requires insurers to maintain a certain safety level. This level is
often expressed as an upper bound on the ruin probability.
Model (A). Because payouts are not made before the end of the contract at time T ,
we consider default risk only at the contract’s maturity (see Schmeiser and Wagner, 2015).
Following the definition of shortfall in Section 2.2, we evaluate the risk on ruin under the real-
world measure P and introduce the solvency rule in T , requiring that the default probability
RT is bounded from above by
RT = Pr(AT < PT ) ≤ ǫT , (14)
with 0 ≤ ǫT ≤ 1. In the following, we assume that the safety level is met exactly by the
insurance companies, i.e., the condition expressed in Equation (14) becomes
Pr(AT < PT ) = ǫT . (15)
Typically, the regulator defines the upper bound ǫ1 on the yearly ruin probability, 0 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ 1.
Then, the probability of surviving T periods is (1 − ǫ)T . Hence, given ǫ1, we calculate the
corresponding ruin probability for a T -year period ǫT as follows
ǫT = 1− (1− ǫ1)
T . (16)
Model (B). Using an implementation that is closer to regulatory practice we consider that
ruin can occur at any period t∗, t∗ = 1, . . . , T (cf. Section 2.2) and thus solvency is monitored
on a yearly basis. The corresponding solvency requirement can be expressed through requiring
Rt = Pr(At < Pt) ≤ ǫ1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T, (17)
where ǫ1 is the prescribed maximum one-year default probability introduced above. As in
model (A), we suppose that insurance companies will fulfill this requirement exactly, i.e., we
use the following conditions
Pr(At < Pt) = ǫ1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T. (18)
2.4 Return and Utility Measurement
We separately introduce the perspectives of the policyholders and equity holders on the contract
assessment. For the policyholders, we consider their effective rate of return on investment and
utility; for the equity holders, we introduce a return-on-equity measure. The values obtained
from these measures allow us to discuss the optimal parameterization of the contract (e.g., with
respect to the guarantee rate g and the participation rate α).
Return on Premiums (RoP ). In a first step, we assume that the policyholders analyze
the contract in light of the effective return they earn on their premiums invested in the product.
In fact, to compare the insurance product with other investment opportunities, policyholders
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are interested in knowing to what the internal rate of return the final payoff corresponds. We
call return on premiums (RoP ) this measure that builds on the expected value of their payoff
(EP[LT ]) under the real-world measure P. Thus, RoP is defined as a solution of the equation
EP (LT ) =
T−1∑
t=0
Πt (1 +RoP )
T−t . (19)
Utility Function and Certainty Equivalent (CE). Furthermore, following Schmeiser
and Wagner (2015), we also let policyholders assess the contract through their individual pref-
erences and the corresponding expected utility or certainty equivalent. We assume that the
policyholder endowed with a level of wealth w has a power (isoelastic) utility function given by
U(w) =
w1−ρ
1− ρ
, (20)
where ρ > 0, ρ 6= 1, is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. Higher values of ρ
correspond to higher levels of risk aversion. The contract assessment is based on the expected
utility of the final policyholder payoff LT . Thus, we calculate the certainty equivalent CE from
U(CE) = EP[U(LT )]. (21)
Return on Equity (RoE). Finally, we assume equity holders to consider the yearly
return on their investment when making decisions. We introduce the expected return on equity
denoted by RoE and defined as follows:
RoE =
(
EP[ET ]
E0
)1/T
− 1 =
(
EP[AT − LT ]
E0
)1/T
− 1. (22)
2.5 Summary of the Model Framework
In Figure 2, we summarize the model framework and present the outline for our analyses. From
the parameters introduced, we focus on two contract parameters, the guaranteed interest rate g
and the surplus participation rate α, and two environmental variables, the imposed solvency
restriction on the annual ruin probability ǫ1 and the market risk-free return rate rf . Given a
reference parameterization, we derive the (unique) position that the insurance company will
take in terms of equity capital E∗0 and asset allocation γ
∗
t . The insurer’s capital endowment
and investment strategy will lead to a payoff distribution for the policyholder and the equity
holder. The results are assessed using the return and expected utility concepts of RoP and
CE and RoE, respectively. In our sensitivity analyses, we vary the values of the contract
parameters and the environment variables to study the effects on the insurer’s position and the
consequences for the policyholder’s and equity holder’s valuation.
3 Model Parameterization and Implementation
In this section, we define the model parameters and the setup used as reference situation.
First, we define the contract parameters, followed by the market with investment opportunities
and solvency requirements. Table 1 summarizes the parameter settings, and Table 2 gives
an overview of the further variables used. Detailed implementation notes are available in the
Appendix.
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Framework
• competitive market assumption
• solvency restriction (ruin prob. < ǫ1)
Available investments
• risk-free with return rate rf
• risky asset caracterized by (µB, σB)
Contract parameters
• policyholder premiums Πt
• duration T
• guaranteed interest rate g
• surplus participation rate α
Contract parameters (g, α)
Environment variables ǫ1 and rf
Insurer position
Equity capital E∗0
Asset allocation γ∗t
Policyholder assessment
Return on Premiums RoP
Expected utility and CE
Equity holder valuation
Return on Equity RoE
Figure 2: Overview of model framework assumptions and outline of analyses.
Contract parameters. Following Schmeiser and Wagner (2015), in model (A), the pol-
icyholder pays a single upfront unit premium Π0 = 1 currency unit (C.U.) at the contract
inception (all other Πt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 are equal to zero). In model (B), periodic premi-
ums Πt = 1 C.U. are paid at times t = 0, . . . , T − 1, i.e., at the beginning of each year. In
both models, we consider a contract with a duration of T = 10 years. Using discounting by the
risk-free interest rate rf = 1.5% (see below), the stream of payments in model (B) has a present
value (at contract inception t = 0) of 9.36 C.U.
As laid out in the Introduction, the maximum value of the annual interest rate guarantee
is generally bounded from above by the regulators. For our reference setting, we consider that
the insurance contract offered bears a value of g = 1% (between the maximum in force in
Germany of 1.25 percent and in Switzerland of 0.75 percent). Furthermore, often a minimum
participation rate for the policyholder is requested. We set the offered rate α = 90% (in line
with the minimum applied for certain type of contracts in Germany and in Switzerland). While
these are the values set for the contract in the reference case, the values will be adapted in the
course of our sensitivity analyses. For the policyholder risk aversion, we retain a single value
ρ = 5 for our reference case. This value is in line with the values used by other authors (cf.
Schmeiser and Wagner, 2015; Braun et al., 2015; Schmeiser and Wagner, 2016).
Market and regulatory conditions. For the value of the risk-free interest rate, we
consider the current market remuneration for very safe government bonds. Because the regulator
considers the return of 10-year government bonds as a basis for calculating the upper bound for
the interest rate guarantees, we take about the 2015-value of the 10-year rolling average of Swiss
Government Bond yields and set rf = 1.5% (see also Figure 1). For the risky investment, we
consider a portfolio composed to equal parts of the Swiss Market Index (SMI Index), the Euro
Stoxx 50 Index (SX5E Index) and the S&P 500 Index (SPX Index). We derive their annualized
risk and return figures from a 20-year history of monthly data (January 1996 to December 2015).
Given the historical returns, we calculate the central moments of the yearly return distribution
10
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by taking the correlation structure (annualized variance-covariance matrix) among the three
indexes into account. From the above, we derive the drift and volatility parameters for the
geometric Brownian motion process in our model and set (µB, σB) = (6.1%, 15.6%). Finally, we
consider the solvency regulation in place in Switzerland (SST) and in the E.U. (Solvency II). As
a surrogate to their full framework, we retain that the aim is to limit the frequency of defaults
to a 1-in-200-year event. That is, we consider the yearly ruin probability and set its upper
bound to ǫ1 = 0.5%. While this value applies directly under model (B), the ruin probability
level allowed at maturity in model (A) will be equal to ǫT = 1− (1− ǫ1)
T (cf. Equation 16). In
the case of a T = 10-year contract, we have ǫT = 4.89%.
5
Parameter Variable Value
Policyholder premiums and risk aversion
Model (A), single upfront Πt 1.0 · 1t=0 (C.U.)
Model (B), periodic Πt 1.0 (C.U.)
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ 5
Contract
Duration T 10 (years)
Guaranteed interest rate g 1%
Annual surplus participation rate α 90%
Capital market conditions
Risk-free rate of return rf 1.5%
Drift of the geometric Brownian motion process µB 6.1%
Volatility of the geometric Brownian motion process σB 15.6%
Solvency regulation
One-year ruin probability (upper bound) ǫ1 0.5%
Table 1: Parameterization of the reference case.
Notes: The time index t in Πt runs from 0 to T −1, 1t=0 denotes the indicator function with value equal
to 1 if t = 0 and 0 when t 6= 0, C.U. stands for currency unit.
Parameter Variable
Equity capital at contract inception E0
Asset allocation (share invested risk-free) at times t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 γ, γt
Value of the insurer’s assets at times t = 0, 1, . . . , T At
Value of the policyholder account at times t = 0, 1, . . . , T Pt
Insurer’s portfolio investment return at times t = 1, . . . , T Rt
Cost of the insurer’s insolvency at times t∗ = 1, . . . , T Dt∗
Policyholder payoff at maturity T LT
Equity holder stake at time T ET
Policyholder return on premium RoP
Policyholder individual utility at maturity T U(LT )
Policyholder certainty equivalent from E[U(LT )] CE
Equity holder return on equity RoE
Table 2: Summary of the variables used in the model.
5With this consideration, we importantly differentiate our reference setting from Schmeiser and Wagner (2015),
where a ruin probability of 0.5% is considered for the 10-year contract case.
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4 Results and Analyses
4.1 Case of Model (A)
Illustration of the reference situation. To illustrate the starting point for our analysis,
we calculate the insurer’s position in the parameterization of the reference case. We consider the
market assumptions, an exact fulfillment of the solvency restriction and the insurance contract
parameters as defined in Table 1. We find a single solution (E∗0 , γ
∗), i.e., the insurer’s equity
capital and asset allocation, making the contract fair for both stakeholders (zero net present
value, NPV = 0, cf. Equations 12 and 13) and meeting the solvency requirement (Equation 15,
RT = ǫT ). We illustrate the solution in Figure 3, where we plot both conditions and their
intersection point as the solution for the insurer’s position (compare with Schmeiser and Wagner,
2015, Figure 2). We find E∗0 = 0.014 and γ
∗ = 0.943. The position (E∗0 , γ
∗) is completely set by
the two conditions. In fact, on one hand, investing a higher amount of capital E∗0 or more safely
(higher value for γ∗) would make the contract unfair for equity holders. On the other hand,
lower equity E∗0 or a more risky investment (lower γ
∗) would make the safety level unacceptable.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the net present value NPV and solvency constraints Rt = ǫ = 0.5%
defining the unique position of insurer equity capital E∗0 and asset allocation γ
∗ in model (A)
under the reference case parameterization (see Table 1).
Below, we build on the reference case and analyze the sensitivity of the insurer’s position
and the impact on the policyholder assessment and equity holder valuation.
Impact of changes in the risk-free interest rate. As a first example (cf. Schmeiser
and Wagner, 2015), we illustrate the impact of a decreasing risk-free interest rate rf on the
asset allocation and equity capital position, with all other parameters remaining unchanged.
To some extent, this analysis reconsiders the evolution from the last years observed in the
capital markets with an important decrease in the government bond yields (see Figure 1). We
illustrate the insurer’s position in terms of the equity capital and asset allocation in Figure 4(a)
for values of the risk-free interest rate, which vary from 2.0% to 1.0%. When the risk-free
interest decreases, a larger share of the assets is invested in the risk-free asset and the capital
12
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invested by the equity holders decreases. In fact, the insurance positioning changes to comply
with the solvency requirement (set ruin probability) and the fairness condition (zero net present
value). The change in the insurer’s position has a direct impact on the expected policyholder
and equity holder returns. In fact, see Figure 4(b): within the scenario of a decreasing risk-
free interest rate, the return on premium RoP decreases down to the guaranteed interest rate
g. The effective return of the contract is quickly limited to g, and the participation option
in the insurer’s profits becomes worthless, with rf → log(1 + g).
6 Under this scenario, the
return on equity RoE changes little as long as rf is away from g. When rf approaches g, we
have seen (Figure 4a) that E∗0 goes to zero. The RoE towards the singular point (E
∗
0 = 0,
no financing of the industry) tends to infinity. In Table 3, we report the numerical values
reported in Figure 4. Along with the insurer’s position and the policyholder and equity holder
returns, we add information on the expected policyholder payoff E(LT ), the standard deviation
σ(LT ) of the payoff and the corresponding certainty equivalent CE. We observe that with
decreasing values of rf , the mean payoff decreases, as does the RoP (see above). At the same
time, as a consequence of the less risky asset allocation, the standard deviation decreases. The
policyholders’ CE also decreases: the decreasing payoff values dominate the lower values of the
volatility.
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Figure 4: Model (A) – Variation of the risk-free interest rate. Illustration of the asset allocation
and equity capital insurer positions (E∗0 , γ
∗) and the resulting returns on premium and equity
combinations (RoE,RoP ) under variation of the risk-free interest rate rf between 2.0% and 1.0%
(steps of 0.1%). All other parameter values are taken from the reference case (see Table 1).
Numerical values are reported in Table 3.
Impact of changes in the guaranteed interest rate. The guaranteed interest rate
g must comply with the product regulations. Often, a maximum value is set, but insurance
companies are free to offer lower rates. In contrast to the analysis above, we now keep the
risk-free interest rate rf fixed, and we vary the value of the guaranteed interest rate g. In our
model, setup g is bound from above by erf − 1: that is, for higher values of g, no fair solution is
possible. We study the result of decreasing this guaranteed interest g on both equity holder and
policyholder stakes. Our results are illustrated in Figure 5, and numerical values are reported
6Given that we used continuous compounding for rf and discrete compounding for g (see Equations 3 and 5),
rf = 1.0% does not correspond to the limit point for g = 1.0%. In fact, rf could decrease to log(1+ g) ≈ 0.995%.
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Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
2.0 1.0 90 0.5 0.023 0.902 1.260 0.056 2.34 1.254 0.0424 6.27
1.9 1.0 90 0.5 0.021 0.910 1.245 0.051 2.21 1.240 0.0388 6.27
1.8 1.0 90 0.5 0.019 0.918 1.230 0.046 2.09 1.226 0.0353 6.27
1.7 1.0 90 0.5 0.017 0.926 1.215 0.040 1.97 1.212 0.0319 6.28
1.6 1.0 90 0.5 0.016 0.934 1.200 0.035 1.84 1.197 0.0286 6.28
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.014 0.943 1.185 0.030 1.71 1.183 0.0253 6.30
1.4 1.0 90 0.5 0.012 0.951 1.170 0.025 1.58 1.168 0.0220 6.35
1.3 1.0 90 0.5 0.010 0.960 1.154 0.020 1.45 1.154 0.0187 6.40
1.2 1.0 90 0.5 0.008 0.969 1.139 0.015 1.31 1.139 0.0153 6.49
1.1 1.0 90 0.5 0.006 0.979 1.123 0.009 1.17 1.123 0.0116 6.74
1.0 1.0 90 0.5 0.003 0.993 1.106 0.002 1.02 1.106 0.0055 7.65
Table 3: Model (A) – Variation of the risk-free interest rate. Results from the sensitivity
analysis, see the caption of Figure 4. (The reference case value of rf = 1.5% is highlighted in
bold face.)
in Table 4. For lower g, the insurance liabilities decrease and assets can be invested more
riskily, allowing for lower values of the asset allocation ratio γ∗ (Figure 5a). At the same time,
more equity capital E∗0 to comply with solvency regulation is required; this equity capital gives
good returns (increasing RoE, see Figure 5b). Additionally, policyholders participate in higher
returns (from the more risky asset investments), leading to a higher return on their contributed
premiums RoP . For values of g close to rf, we observe effects that can be compared to the
impact when rf tends to g (see the discussion above and Figure 4). In Table 4, we find that the
policyholder utility (or certainty equivalent CE) increases for lower values of g (in our ceteris
paribus analysis).7
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.5 90 0.5 0.004 0.989 1.164 0.003 1.53 1.164 0.0091 7.34
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.014 0.943 1.185 0.030 1.71 1.183 0.0253 6.30
1.5 0.5 90 0.5 0.018 0.910 1.201 0.050 1.85 1.196 0.0334 6.27
1.5 0.0 90 0.5 0.022 0.881 1.216 0.069 1.97 1.206 0.0402 6.37
1.5 −0.5 90 0.5 0.025 0.853 1.230 0.087 2.09 1.215 0.0462 6.51
1.5 −1.0 90 0.5 0.027 0.827 1.244 0.105 2.20 1.222 0.0519 6.65
1.5 −1.5 90 0.5 0.030 0.801 1.257 0.122 2.31 1.229 0.0574 6.81
Table 4: Model (A) – Variation of the interest rate guarantee. Results from the sensitivity
analysis, see the caption of Figure 5. (The reference case value of g = 1.0% is highlighted in
bold face.)
7In their paper, Braun et al. (2015) analyze in detail the level of guaranteed interest rate to choose to optimize
the policyholders’ utility while keeping the insurance product more valuable than a simple direct investment. The
comparison of the utility from insurance contracts and from other investment forms has also been the focus of
Schmeiser and Wagner (2015) and Schmeiser and Wagner (2016). In this latter study, transaction costs are also
taken into account.
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Figure 5: Model (A) – Variation of the interest rate guarantee. Illustration of the asset allocation
and equity capital insurer positions (E∗0 , γ
∗) and the resulting returns on premium and equity
combinations (RoE,RoP ) under variation of the guaranteed interest rate g between 1.5% and
−1.5% (steps of 0.5%). All other parameter values are taken from the reference case (see
Table 1). Numerical values are reported in Table 4.
Impact of changes in the surplus participation rate. In our model, the policyholder
surplus participation α is a parameter fixed in advance by the insurer (following minimum
participation rules set by the regulator). Increasing the value of α changes the insurer’s position
by increasing the value of the asset allocation ratio γ∗ and decreasing the equity capital. The
results of the analyses are illustrated in Figure 5(a). The consequences of a higher value of
α are very similar to the results obtained when the risk-free rate rf decreases towards the
guaranteed interest rate (compare with Figure 4a). Thus, given the changes in the insurer’s
asset allocation and equity capital, the RoP and RoE are modified (see Figure 5b). Despite
increasing levels of participation, the resulting return on premiums decreases for policyholders.
The equity holders’ return decreases even more significantly. This result is particularly relevant
for discussion on the adequate level of policyholder participation. Higher levels of participation
diminish the attractiveness of the insurer’s position and ultimately tend to make policyholders
worse off than better off. This can also be observed as the policyholders’ certainty equivalent
CE slightly decreases with increasing participation (see Table 5).
Impact of changes in the ruin probability. Finally, we also perform a sensitivity analysis
on the ruin probability objective. A decrease of the ruin probability ǫT increases the solvency
of the company. Not surprisingly, higher solvency levels come along with insurer positions at
higher levels of equity capital E∗0 . The required asset allocation tends to be less risky, but the
required change is less important (see Figure 7a). We also note that the equity holder’s RoE
decreases a lot (more capital for similar asset allocation and returns), while the policyholder’s
RoP decreases relatively little (see Figure 7b). Again, we also report the values in Table 6.
Here, we observe a slight decrease in policyholder utility (slight decrease in the CE).
Impact of combined changes in the guaranteed interest and surplus participation
rates. From the previous sensitivity analyses, we observe two effects that would probably not
have been the outcome of a “naive” contract assessment and that seem counter-intuitive at
15
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(a) Asset allocation γ∗ vs. equity capital E∗0 .
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Figure 6: Model (A) – Variation of the policyholder participation rate. Illustration of the asset
allocation and equity capital insurer positions (E∗0 , γ
∗) and the resulting returns on premium
and equity combinations (RoE,RoP ) under variation of the policyholder participation rate α
between 80% and 98% (steps of 2.0%) and 99%. All other parameter values are taken from the
reference case (see Table 1).
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Figure 7: Model (A) – Variation of the safety level. Illustration of the asset allocation and equity
capital insurer positions (E∗0 , γ
∗) and the resulting returns on premium and equity combinations
(RoE,RoP ) under variation of the ruin probability ǫ between 1.00% and 0.05%. All other
parameter values are taken from the reference case (see Table 1). Numerical values are reported
in Table 6.
first sight. On one hand, the policyholder’s RoP and CE increase with a ceteris paribus lower
guaranteed interest rate or a lower surplus participation. On the other hand, these scenarios
also increase the equity holder’s RoE. We further underline this observation in the following.
In Figure 8(a)–(d), we illustrate the impact of contract changes in the guaranteed interest
rate g and policyholder participation α on the equity capital E∗0 , on the asset allocation γ
∗,
on the return on equity RoE and on the return on premium RoP . Lowering the guaranteed
interest rate g and the policyholder surplus participation α impacts the capital amount to be
invested E∗0 and the allocation strategy γ
∗ (see Figures 8a and b). Requiring a higher amount
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Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.0 80 0.5 0.026 0.914 1.190 0.038 1.76 1.187 0.0515 7.05
1.5 1.0 82 0.5 0.023 0.920 1.189 0.036 1.75 1.186 0.0458 6.93
1.5 1.0 84 0.5 0.021 0.926 1.188 0.035 1.74 1.186 0.0403 6.81
1.5 1.0 86 0.5 0.018 0.931 1.187 0.033 1.73 1.185 0.0350 6.67
1.5 1.0 88 0.5 0.016 0.937 1.186 0.032 1.72 1.184 0.0300 6.51
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.014 0.943 1.185 0.030 1.71 1.183 0.0253 6.30
1.5 1.0 92 0.5 0.011 0.948 1.183 0.028 1.70 1.182 0.0207 6.06
1.5 1.0 94 0.5 0.009 0.954 1.182 0.026 1.69 1.181 0.0161 5.77
1.5 1.0 96 0.5 0.007 0.960 1.180 0.023 1.67 1.179 0.0116 5.34
1.5 1.0 98 0.5 0.004 0.968 1.178 0.020 1.65 1.177 0.0069 4.66
1.5 1.0 99 0.5 0.003 0.973 1.176 0.017 1.63 1.175 0.0043 4.03
Table 5: Model (A) – Variation of the policyholder participation rate. Results from the sensi-
tivity analysis, see the caption of Figure 6. (The reference case value of α = 90% is highlighted
in bold face.)
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.0 90 1.00 0.010 0.940 1.187 0.032 1.73 1.185 0.0206 7.35
1.5 1.0 90 0.50 0.014 0.943 1.185 0.030 1.71 1.183 0.0253 6.30
1.5 1.0 90 0.20 0.019 0.944 1.183 0.029 1.70 1.182 0.0316 5.37
1.5 1.0 90 0.10 0.022 0.945 1.183 0.029 1.69 1.181 0.0362 4.88
1.5 1.0 90 0.05 0.026 0.945 1.183 0.028 1.69 1.181 0.0409 4.49
Table 6: Model (A) – Variation of the safety level. Results from the sensitivity analysis, see the
caption of Figure 7. (The reference case value of ǫ = 0.5% is highlighted in bold face.)
of equity makes the asset allocation chosen by the insurer more risky. At the same time, the
expected RoE increases (see Figure 8c). The increase of the RoE stems mainly from the change
in the policyholder’s participation. Still, a decrease in the guaranteed interest rate g and in the
participation rate α is observed to be beneficial for the overall policyholder return RoP (see
Figure 8d).
The underlying rationale for our results essentially stems from the lower promises made to
the policyholder (guarantee and participation rates), allowing for a riskier asset allocation while
simultaneously increasing the required capital (which is also better rewarded). As we have seen
from the analyses above, these rewarding situations in terms of expected values typically bring
higher uncertainty on the final payoff. This can be observed in the values for σ(LT ) reported in
Tables 4 and 3. However, the expected utility expressed through the certainty equivalent CE
can still increase (cf. our results reported using the risk aversion of ρ = 5).
4.2 Case of Model (B)
Illustration of the evolution of the asset allocation. In model (B), while the level
of equity capital E0 will be fixed at contract inception for the whole duration (as seen in
model A), the asset allocation is adapted by the insurer at the beginning of each period under
consideration of the available assets. Available assets at time t include the value at that time
17
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Figure 8: Model A. Impact of contract changes in the guaranteed interest rate g and policyholder
participation α on the equity capital E∗0 , on the asset allocation γ
∗, on the return on equity
RoE and on the return on premium RoP .
of the equity capital and premium income. Using the parameterization of the reference case
reported in Table 1, we find that the insurer will position at E∗0 = 0.053. The yearly mean values
of γˆt are reported in Table 7 and illustrated in Figure 9. We note that the asset allocation is
more risky at the beginning of the contract (γˆ0 = 0.822) than towards the end of the contract
(γˆT−1 = γˆ9 = 0.955). This dynamic stems from the fact that, at contract inception, a relatively
high amount of equity capital E∗0 compared to the contract premiums is available. In fact, in
both models (A) and (B), we consider that equity holders invest a single upfront amount E∗0 for
the whole contract duration T . In model (B), considering the first year’s premium amount, the
initial equity capital E0 is too large in comparison. This allows the insurer to invest more riskily
under the solvency requirements (see Figure 9). We will see that this opportunity implies better
expected returns on assets, i.e., higher expected returns on premiums and on equity (Figure 10).
The (non-weighted) average value over the whole duration yields γ¯ = 1T
∑T−1
t=0 γˆt = 0.932.
The values of E∗0 and γ¯ can also be compared to the values obtained in model (A). Because
the present value of premium payments is higher in model (B), 9.36 C.U. in model (B) against
1 C.U. in model (A), we expect a higher value of E∗0 : see Section 3. Under the reference
case parameterization, we have found E∗0 = 0.014 in model (A). The value of E
∗
0 = 0.053
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Figure 9: Illustration of the yearly (average) asset allocation γˆt under the model (B) reference
case parameterization (see Table 1).
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
γˆt 0.822 0.905 0.931 0.943 0.949 0.952 0.954 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.932
Table 7: Values of the yearly (average) asset allocation γˆt under the model (B) reference case
parameterization (see Table 1).
is approximately four times higher, essentially due to the higher contract value in terms of
premiums. The asset allocation for the whole duration in model (A) has yielded γ∗ = 0.943.
This is relatively close to the average value γ¯ = 0.932 found in model (B).
Sensitivity analyses. In the following, we present sensitivity analyses for parameter
ranges similar to the ones used in Section 4.1. We present our results in the graphs in Fig-
ure 10. Numerical values are reported in the Tables 10 to 13 in the Appendix. In the graphs
in Figure 10, the asset allocation and equity capital insurer positions (E∗0 , γ¯) and the resulting
returns on premium and equity combinations (RoE,RoP ) are illustrated. Figures 10(a) and
(b) present the results for variations of the risk-free interest rate rf . The graphs (c) and (d)
report the results for different values of the guaranteed interest rate g. The sensitivity analysis
on the policyholder participation rate α is presented in graphs (e) and (f), while the results for
different values of the ruin probability ǫ are given in graphs (g) and (h).
We now compare the results from the sensitivity analyses reported in Figure 10 with the
results obtained in the framework of model (A), i.e., Figures 4 to 7 of Section 4.1. While the
numerical results are different (in terms of absolute numbers), the overall shape and behavior of
the insurer position and the resulting returns remains very similar. In the case where the risk-
free interest rf diminishes, we observe in both models decreasing equity capital positions and a
more conservative asset allocation that leads to lower policyholder returns. When decreasing the
guaranteed interest g, we see the opposite trends with increasing equity, riskier asset allocation
and higher returns on premiums. Additionally, in both models, an increase in the policyholder
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analyses in Model (B). Illustration of the positions (E∗0 , γ¯
∗) and the
returns combinations (RoE,RoP ) under variation of the risk-free interest rf , the guaranteed
interest g, the policyholder participation α and the ruin probability ǫ. Parameter values are
taken from the reference case (see Table 1).
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participation rate α has similar effects on the insurer position than the decreasing risk-free rate
scenario. In terms of returns, mainly the return on equity is decreasing. As observed before, a
lower required ruin probability ǫ impacts the amount of capital needed and decreases the equity
holder’s return. In model (B), the return on premiums is also affected (more negatively than in
model A).
5 Conclusion
We use a contingent claims model framework to assess the equity holder’s and policyholder’s
stakes in life and pension insurance products. We assume contracts with interest rate guarantees
and profit participation that are regulated by solvency requirements. We build our analysis on
earlier studies, particularly the most recent work by Schmeiser and Wagner (2015). Given the
difficult capital market environment and the solvency requirements, offering guarantees that are
rewarding for equity holders and policyholders has become a challenge. We aim at determining
the key parameter values that optimize the value proposition of such contracts.
Our study is based on a reference setup on which we apply parameter sensitivity analyses.
For given contract parameters (duration, interest rate guarantee and surplus participation rate)
under prevailing market conditions (risk-free rate of return, risky investment) and solvency
regulation (maximum ruin probability) we numerically derive the capital needed and the asset
allocation. Our main findings on the contract parameters are as follows:
• Decreasing the interest rate guarantee allows for a higher investment share in the risky
asset while requiring higher equity capital; thereby policyholder and equity holder returns
increase.
• Decreasing the participation rate has a similar impact on the investment and the capital;
thereby essentially equity holder returns increase along with a lower increase of policy-
holder returns.
With regard to the market and regulatory conditions we find that a lower required ruin proba-
bility implies more equity capital and lower return on equity. A decreasing risk-free interest rate
implies a higher share of riskless investments, lower equity capital and diminishing policyholder
returns.
In summary, we find that contracts with lower guarantees and lower participation rates can
still imply higher customer returns. The rationale behind this finding is that the assets linked
to such contracts can be invested more riskily because solvency constraints for given capital
are alleviated. The policyholder’s assets are still protected against downsides by the minimum
return guarantee. Furthermore, the return on equity for the investors increases, while higher
capital amounts can be attracted and are needed.
In the first model considered (cf. also Schmeiser and Wagner, 2015), solvency is controlled for
at maturity and a single premium is paid upfront. While this hypothesis can be justified as long
as payouts only occur at maturity, the practice of solvency regulation requires yearly assessments
that may imply adaptations in the asset allocation. Thus, our second model considers yearly
solvency testing and allows for periodic premium payments. Putting side-by-side the models for
one-year and at-maturity solvency requirements, as well as single and periodic premiums, we
find that the conceptual results remain similar, i.e., the previously found win-win situations for
both policyholders and equity holders still exist. However, the numerical values at which these
situations occur may be significantly different. Therefore, we conclude that, despite necessary
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model assumptions and simplifications, modeling that is “close enough” to real life is essential,
particularly when the market landscape is highly competitive.
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Appendix
Model implementation
Implementation notes for the model (A). Because no closed-form solutions are avail-
able for the policyholder payoff LT (Equation 7) and the equity holder stake ET (Equation 8), we
use the Monte Carlo simulation technique. In both models (A) and (B), we generate N = 100 000
different realizations over the period of T years. The iterative calculations at times t of At and
Pt are straightforward. The main challenge is the calculation of the required equity capital E
∗
0
and the asset allocation γ∗. For deriving both quantities, we make use of the competitive market
constraint (Equation 13) and the solvency requirement (Equation 15). The implementation of
the algorithm follows the following steps:
1. Generate N × T independent identically distributed (iid) random variables (rv) from a
standard normal distribution W it ∼ N(0, 1), where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
2. For an initial asset allocation γ ∈ (0, 1), calculate Ai,Pt (γ) and P
i,P
t (γ) (cf. Equations 3
and 5, respectively) and Ai,Qt (γ) and P
i,Q
t (γ) at each time t and for each scenario i under
the P- and Q-measures, respectively.8
3. Define the capital needed Ei0(γ) such that A
i,P
T (γ)−P
i,P
T (γ) = 0 in each scenario i. Order
the obtained Ei0(γ) such that, E
i:N
0 (γ) ≥ E
(i+1):N
0 (γ) for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Given the
upper bound for the probability of ruin ǫT define the function E0(γ) such that E0(γ) =
E
⌈ǫT ·N⌉:N
0 (γ).
4. Using E0(γ) for the initial equity capital in A
i,Q
t (γ), introduce the Monte Carlo approxi-
mation of the policyholder contract’s net present value under the Q-measure
N̂PV (γ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
P i,QT (γ)−max
(
P i,QT (γ)−A
i,Q
T (γ), 0
)]
· e−rf·T − P0.
5. Numerically find γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) as the solution of N̂PV (γ∗) = 0 and set E∗0 = E0(γ
∗) using
the above. The optimal insurer position is given by the pair (E∗0 , γ
∗).
Implementation notes for the model (B). In the numerical implementation, we will
make use of the solvency requirement (18) and competitive market-pricing constraint (12).
• First, we derive a formula to calculate the asset allocation γt from (18), where γt at time
t is a function of the assets At−1, the policyholder account Pt−1 and the premium Πt−1
from the previous period (t− 1), as well as the given contract parameters (g and ǫ1) and
the given available investments (parameters rf, µB , and σB).
8For the evaluation under the Q-measure, µB is replaced by rf in Equation (4), defining R
Q
t .
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Consider the event At = {At − Pt < 0}:
At ⇐⇒
{
(At−1 + Πt−1) ·
(
1 +RPt
)
− (Pt−1 + Πt−1) ·
(
1 + max
(
g, αRPt
))
< 0
}
⇐⇒
{
θt−1 ·
(
1 +RPt
)
−
(
1 + max
(
g, αRPt
))
< 0
}
, with θt−1 =
At−1 + Πt−1
Pt−1 + Πt−1
> 19
⇐⇒
{ {
θt−1 ·
(
1 +RPt
)
−
(
1 + αRPt
)
< 0
}
if g < αRPt{
θt−1 ·
(
1 +RPt
)
− (1 + g) < 0
}
otherwise
⇐⇒


{
RPt <
1−θt−1
θt−1−α
}
if g/α < RPt{
RPt <
1+g
θt−1
− 1
}
otherwise
Thus, from Equation (18),
Pr (At) = ǫt
⇐⇒ Pr
(
RPt <
1− θt−1
θt−1 − α
∣∣∣∣RPt > gα
)
· Pr
(
RPt >
g
α
)
+ Pr
(
RPt <
1 + g
θt−1
− 1
∣∣∣∣RPt < gα
)
· Pr
(
RPt <
g
α
)
= ǫt
⇐⇒ Pr
(
g
α
< RPt <
1− θt−1
θt−1 − α
)
+ Pr
[
RPt <
(
1 + g
θt−1
− 1
)
; RPt <
g
α
]
= ǫt
⇐⇒


Pr
(
g
α < R
P
t <
1−θt−1
θt−1−α
)
+ Pr
(
RPt <
g
α
)
= ǫt if θt−1 < θ
∗ 10
Pr
(
RPt <
1+g
θt−1
− 1
)
= ǫt otherwise
11
⇐⇒


Pr
(
RPt <
1−θt−1
θt−1−α
)
= ǫt if θt−1 < θ
∗
Pr
(
RPt <
1+g
θt−1
− 1
)
= ǫt otherwise
⇐⇒


Pr
[
W Pt −W
P
t−1 <
1
σB
ln
( 1−α
θt−1−α
−γterf
(1−γt)e
µB−σ
2
B
/2
)]
= ǫt if θt−1 < θ
∗
Pr
[
W Pt −W
P
t−1 ≤
1
σB
ln
( 1+g
θt−1
−γterf
(1−γt)e
µB−σ
2
B
/2
)]
= ǫt otherwise
⇐⇒


1
σB
ln
( 1−α
θt−1−α
−γterf
(1−γt)e
µB−σ
2
B
/2
)
= Φ−1 (ǫt) if θt−1 < θ
∗
1
σB
ln
( 1+g
θt−1
−γterf
(1−γt)e
µB−σ
2
B
/2
)
= Φ−1 (ǫt) otherwise
with Φ the cumulative normal distribution function. Hence, the asset allocation γt at
9The inequality holds because the policy is solvent at time t−1, i.e., At−1 > Pt−1, and the premium Πt−1 > 0.
10In fact for g
α
< 1+g
θt−1
− 1 we have Pr
[
RPt <
(
1+g
θt−1
− 1
)
; RPt <
g
α
]
= Pr
(
RPt <
g
α
)
and we rewrite g/α <
1+g
θt−1
− 1 ⇐⇒ θt−1 <
1+g
1+g/α
= θ∗ where we need (1 + g/α) > 0. In our application with α close to 100% and g
close to zero this condition is fulfilled.
11In the case where g
α
> 1+g
θt−1
− 1 we have Pr
(
g
α
< RPt <
1−θt−1
θt−1−α
)
= 0 and Pr
[
RPt <
(
1+g
θt−1
− 1
)
;RPt <
g
α
]
=
Pr
(
RPt <
1+g
θt−1
− 1
)
.
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time t is given by:
Pr (At) = ǫt ⇐⇒ γt =


eµB−σ
2
B/2+σBΦ
−1(ǫt)− 1−α
θt−1−α
e
µB−σ
2
B
/2+σBΦ
−1(ǫt)−erf
if θt−1 < θ
∗,
eµB−σ
2
B/2+σBΦ
−1(ǫt)− 1+g
θt−1
e
µB−σ
2
B
/2+σBΦ
−1(ǫt)−erf
otherwise.
• Following the implementation of model (A), define the yearly asset allocations γit in each
scenario i (see above). Under these allocations, consider the Monte Carlo estimate of the
equity holder’s net present value
N̂PV (E0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
[
Ai
Q
T (E0)− P
iQ
T (E0) , 0
]
e−rf·T − E0,
where we use E0 = E0({γ
i
t}). The numerical solution of the optimal equity capital E
∗
0 > 0
from (12) comes from N̂PV (E∗0) = 0. For calculating E
∗
0 define a recursive formula E
(j)
0
of the expected equity capital at maturity T discounted at t = 0,
E
(j+1)
0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
[
Ai
Q
T
(
E
(j)
0
)
− P i
Q
T
(
E
(j)
0
)
, 0
]
e−rf·T .
For any initial E
(0)
0 ∈ R there exists a k such that, E
(k)
0 = E
(k+1)
0 = E
∗
0 .
In the presentation of our results, we will make use of the following notations. We introduce
the yearly average of asset allocation γˆt,
γˆt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γt,i, (23)
and the asset allocation average of the portfolio during the whole duration of the contract,
γ¯ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
γˆt. (24)
26
C. Mirza and J. Wagner – Participating Life Insurance: Which Contracts Are Win-Win?
Further results for model (A)
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.5 90 0.5 0.003 0.969 1.171 0.006 1.59 1.171 0.0114 15.59
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.007 0.872 1.217 0.036 1.99 1.215 0.0258 13.18
1.5 0.5 90 0.5 0.010 0.803 1.253 0.058 2.28 1.246 0.0343 13.14
1.5 0.0 90 0.5 0.012 0.741 1.286 0.080 2.55 1.274 0.0418 13.35
1.5 −0.5 90 0.5 0.014 0.682 1.318 0.101 2.80 1.299 0.0490 13.62
1.5 −1.0 90 0.5 0.015 0.627 1.349 0.123 3.04 1.322 0.0560 13.93
1.5 −1.5 90 0.5 0.017 0.573 1.380 0.144 3.27 1.344 0.0629 14.25
Table 8: Model (A) – Variation of the interest rate guarantee with volatility σB/2. Compare
with Table 4.
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γ
∗ E(LT ) σ(LT ) RoP (%) CE E(ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.0 80 0.5 0.014 0.792 1.240 0.050 2.18 1.235 0.0592 15.37
1.5 1.0 82 0.5 0.013 0.809 1.235 0.047 2.14 1.231 0.0513 15.05
1.5 1.0 84 0.5 0.011 0.826 1.231 0.044 2.10 1.227 0.0441 14.67
1.5 1.0 86 0.5 0.010 0.842 1.226 0.041 2.06 1.223 0.0375 14.24
1.5 1.0 88 0.5 0.009 0.857 1.222 0.038 2.02 1.219 0.0315 13.75
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.007 0.872 1.217 0.036 1.99 1.215 0.0258 13.18
1.5 1.0 92 0.5 0.006 0.887 1.213 0.033 1.95 1.210 0.0206 12.49
1.5 1.0 94 0.5 0.005 0.901 1.208 0.029 1.91 1.206 0.0156 11.64
1.5 1.0 96 0.5 0.004 0.917 1.202 0.026 1.86 1.201 0.0109 10.49
1.5 1.0 98 0.5 0.003 0.934 1.195 0.021 1.80 1.194 0.0062 8.61
1.5 1.0 99 0.5 0.002 0.945 1.191 0.018 1.76 1.190 0.0037 7.06
Table 9: Model (A) – Variation of the policyholder participation rate with volatility σB/2. Com-
pare with Table 5.
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Detailed results for model (B)
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γˆ
∗ E (LT ) σ RoP (%) CE E (ET ) RoE (%)
2.0 1.0 90 0.5 0.089 0.885 11.592 1.261 2.668 11.531 0.180 7.32
1.9 1.0 90 0.5 0.082 0.894 11.515 1.253 2.548 11.455 0.166 7.36
1.8 1.0 90 0.5 0.074 0.903 11.438 1.245 2.428 11.379 0.152 7.41
1.7 1.0 90 0.5 0.067 0.913 11.361 1.238 2.306 11.302 0.138 7.47
1.6 1.0 90 0.5 0.060 0.922 11.284 1.232 2.188 11.225 0.124 7.55
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.053 0.932 11.206 1.226 2.063 11.148 0.111 7.67
1.4 1.0 90 0.5 0.045 0.942 11.127 1.221 1.936 11.070 0.096 7.82
1.3 1.0 90 0.5 0.038 0.952 11.049 1.216 1.808 10.991 0.082 8.08
1.2 1.0 90 0.5 0.030 0.963 10.969 1.212 1.677 10.911 0.067 8.50
Table 10: Results from the sensitivity analysis in model (B) under variation of the risk-free
interest rate, see Figure 10(a,b).
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γˆ
∗ E (LT ) σ RoP (%) CE E (ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.2 90 0.5 0.041 0.949 11.172 1.227 2.009 11.114 0.091 8.15
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.053 0.932 11.206 1.226 2.063 11.148 0.111 7.67
1.5 0.5 90 0.5 0.074 0.897 11.280 1.228 2.183 11.221 0.148 7.25
1.5 0.0 90 0.5 0.090 0.866 11.348 1.236 2.285 11.287 0.179 7.15
1.5 −0.5 90 0.5 0.103 0.839 11.413 1.250 2.389 11.350 0.206 7.16
1.5 −1.0 90 0.5 0.116 0.812 11.476 1.269 2.488 11.410 0.232 7.21
1.5 −1.5 90 0.5 0.127 0.787 11.538 1.293 2.585 11.468 0.257 7.28
Table 11: Results from the sensitivity analysis in model (B) under variation of the interest rate
guarantee, see Figure 10(c,d).
Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γˆ
∗ E (LT ) σ RoP (%) CE E (ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.0 84 0.5 0.071 0.912 11.219 1.231 2.084 11.160 0.166 8.91
1.5 1.0 86 0.5 0.065 0.919 11.215 1.229 2.078 11.156 0.147 8.53
1.5 1.0 88 0.5 0.059 0.925 11.211 1.227 2.071 11.152 0.129 8.12
1.5 1.0 90 0.5 0.053 0.932 11.206 1.226 2.063 11.148 0.111 7.67
1.5 1.0 92 0.5 0.046 0.939 11.200 1.224 2.054 11.142 0.092 7.16
1.5 1.0 94 0.5 0.039 0.946 11.194 1.223 2.044 11.136 0.074 6.59
1.5 1.0 96 0.5 0.031 0.954 11.186 1.223 2.031 11.128 0.055 5.89
1.5 1.0 98 0.5 0.021 0.964 11.175 1.222 2.013 11.117 0.034 4.93
Table 12: Results from the sensitivity analysis in model (B) under variation of the policyholder
participation rate, see Figure 10(e,f).
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Parameters (in %) Insurer Policyholder Equity holder
rf g α ǫ E
∗
0 γˆ
∗ E (LT ) σ RoP (%) CE E (ET ) RoE (%)
1.5 1.0 90 1.00 0.044 0.934 11.431 1.688 2.417 11.320 0.098 8.32
1.5 1.0 90 0.50 0.053 0.932 11.206 1.226 2.063 11.148 0.111 7.67
1.5 1.0 90 0.20 0.063 0.930 11.069 0.798 1.841 11.044 0.124 7.02
1.5 1.0 90 0.10 0.069 0.930 11.020 0.563 1.760 11.007 0.132 6.65
1.5 1.0 90 0.05 0.075 0.929 10.998 0.419 1.724 10.991 0.140 6.35
1.5 1.0 90 0.02 0.083 0.928 10.985 0.300 1.704 10.982 0.148 6.03
1.5 1.0 90 0.01 0.088 0.928 10.981 0.243 1.696 10.978 0.154 5.83
Table 13: Results from the sensitivity analysis in model (B) under variation of the safety level,
see Figure 10(g,h).
29
